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Abstract: In this paper we investigate how country shareholding arrangements affect the lending 
of multilateral development banks (MDBs) under different economic conditions and over time. 
To do so, we consider three different “types” of MDBs—one dominated by non-borrowers (the 
World Bank), another controlled by borrowing countries (the Corporación Andina de Fomento, 
CAF), and a third where control is more evenly split between borrowers and non-borrowers (the 
Inter-American Development Bank, IADB)—and a common set of borrowing countries in Latin 
America. Descriptive statistics as well as econometric analysis based on seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation (SURE) and panel regressions indicate that the lending of the three MDBs 
does indeed react in a systematically different way to specific economic conditions. As a general 
trend, countries increasingly favor the CAF and IADB as a source of multilateral borrowing, 
while during crisis times World Bank lending tends to increase significantly and more strongly 
than lending by the CAF. IADB lending also increases very strongly during crises, but remains at 
a relatively high level throughout. In line with expectations based on the different shareholder 
arrangements, the paper also finds links between borrower government policy stances and World 
Bank/IADB lending, but none for the CAF.  
                                                             
1 This paper benefited from comments by Christopher Kilby, Sebastian Fehler and Ken Shadlen.  
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I. Introduction 
 
In academic literature as well as general public perception, the World Bank and other 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) have long been viewed as domineering 
organizations able to impose themselves upon developing countries. Since the mid-
1990s, however, a number of emerging market governments have found themselves in 
strong financial positions, due to, among other factors, the huge rise in global private 
capital flows, high foreign exchange income from rising commodity prices and growing 
export industries, and much-improved fiscal management. Whether these trends 
represent short-term developments or a more fundamental shift in the world economy is 
open to debate. But economies such as China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico and 
Peru—which together accounted for nearly half (44%) of the World Bank’s loan 
portfolio in 2009—now have well-managed fiscal accounts, low public debt levels, high 
international reserves, and well-established access to international capital markets.  
Despite this sea change in economic conditions for many developing countries, little 
attention has been paid in academic literature to how this might impact the behavior of 
MDBs. Considering that MDBs are designed to self-finance their operations mainly from 
the proceeds of their loans—perhaps the single trait that best explains their remarkable 
success as an organizational model—this would seem to be a fundamental question. Is 
borrowing from MDBs on the decline, and if so, are some MDBs facing a more serious 
drop in lending than others? The academic literature is as yet silent on these issues, 
despite their far-reaching implications for their stability as financial institutions, and on 
international development more broadly. 
As well, existing research on MDBs focuses almost exclusively on the World Bank, with 
only occasional references to other large regional MDBs such as the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank.2 More than 20 MDBs exist,3 and 
many are larger lenders to their particular market than the World Bank. Do different 
MDBs mediate the interests of their country shareholders in different ways? How might 
the various shareholding arrangements among different MDBs impact their lending 
operations? Do borrowing countries prefer working with some MDBs over others in 
different situations?  
This paper begins addressing some of these questions by comparing the annual lending 
of three different MDBs—the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB), and the Andean Development Corporation (Corporación Andina de Fomento—
                                                             
2 Exceptions include Kilby 2006 and 2010, Krasner 1981, IDS 2000, Adams 2005, and Griffith-Jones 2008.  
3 An MDB can be defined as an international organization that: i) is created by international treaty among 
sovereign nations, which are its shareholders; ii) has the mission of promoting economic development in less 
developed countries; iii) makes loans largely (but not necessarily exclusively) to sovereign governments; iv) 
is for the most part financially self-sufficient, without requiring regular contributions from shareholding 
countries; and v) raises money for lending primarily on private capital markets, with the guarantee of their 
shareholding countries. See IDS (2000).  
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CAF)—from 1980 to 2009. We suggest that the lending varies systematically as a 
function of both: prevailing economic conditions among borrowers, and the type of 
shareholding arrangement in each MDB. The three types of MDB shareholder 
arrangements considered are: domination by wealthy donor countries (at the World 
Bank); stronger but still subordinate influence of borrowing countries (at the IADB); and 
complete control by borrowing countries (at the CAF). The operational characteristics of 
each MDB derived from these shareholder arrangements, we suggest, strongly condition 
the pattern of their lending in different economic circumstances. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews relevant scholarship on MDBs and 
derives the hypotheses to be tested. Section III examines trends in aggregate lending 
commitments by the World Bank, IADB and CAF and three variables proxying 
economic conditions among borrowing countries. Section IV uses seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation (SURE) and panel regressions to test the relationship between these 
variables for ten major Latin American economies. Section V discusses the overall 
results in the light of possible extensions to other regional development banks. 
Section VI concludes.  
 
II. Theoretical Underpinnings and Hypotheses 
The range of theoretical viewpoints on international organizations (IOs) in general and 
MDBs in particular in the academic literature is broad, which should come as no surprise. 
Situated as they are at the junction of international politics, the global economy and the 
development prospects of millions of the world’s poor, it would be surprising indeed if a 
single theoretical model were adequate to satisfactorily explain MDB behavior. 
Approaches range from “realist” considerations of power politics (cf. Thacker, 1999; 
Dreher et al., 2009a and 2009b; Kilby 2010, among many others), a “rationalist” focus on 
the rules of the game and incentives among main actors in MDB activities (cf. Ascher, 
1990; Mosley et al., 1995; Vaubel, 2006; Gutner, 2005), or more sociology-based 
“constructivist” interpretations of norms and values (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999 and 
2004; Babb, 2003). A growing number of scholars are combining constructivist and 
rationalist approaches, including Nielson, Tierney and Weaver (2006), Weaver (2008) 
and Chwieroth (2005).  
However, it is notable how little existing research even mentions the character of MDBs 
as financial institutions.4 Yet their self-financing nature is one of the main reasons MDBs 
have been so successful over the past six decades: they impose very little direct fiscal 
costs to wealthy countries, undertake the provision of what is generally considered a 
global public good—development assistance—and, arguably, further the geopolitical 
interests of powerful shareholders. MDBs must act in part as income-maximizing (or at 
least loss-minimizing) organizations to ensure their autonomy and survival. Thus they 
share certain traits not only with public bureaucracies, but also with private businesses. 
                                                             
4 Exceptions include Kapur 2002a, Aziz 2004, and Bulow and Rogoff 2005. 
4 
 
The literature arising out of organizational sociology and resource constraints suggests 
that financial pressures are likely to have very important impacts on the behavior of 
MDBs. Pfeffer and Salancik (1975) and more recently Barnett and Coleman (2005) 
emphasize how the drive to secure external resources can strongly shape the strategies 
and activities taken by an organization as well as individuals within it, even if these 
strategies and activities are not always in line with the organization’s nominal mission. 
For an MDB, the critical external resource is a portfolio of interest-generating loans.5 
Hence this theoretical consideration informs our decision to focus on lending patterns as 
the key variable of interest. Future research can then build on the results of this study to 
consider if and how changing lending may impact MDB financial sustainability, and in 
turn the policies and actions of MDBs (for example, possibly leading to competition 
among MDBs and with private sources of capital).  
Another notable shortcoming of existing literature is a single-minded focus on the role of 
the United States in shaping MDB actions. As Lyne et al. (2009) point out in relation to 
the World Bank, the US is far from the only shareholder able to influence an MDB. The 
authors highlight the “complexity” of principals to help explain how policies evolve 
through the collective preferences of all shareholding countries, as mediated by 
governance rules. Clearly the US has disproportionate ability to influence the actions of 
MDBs of which it is a shareholder. But it is overly simplistic to suggest that formal 
voting rules are merely a façade to disguise US control and that other countries have no 
role in influencing MDBs. Academic research into MDBs needs to find ways to 
incorporate the role of other shareholders beyond the US or even the G7 to gain a more 
realistic understanding of how MDB decisions are actually made and implemented. One 
notable example in this direction is Kilby’s 2010 article on the Asian Development Bank.  
The framework of complex principals outlined by Lyne et al. forms the basis for 
generating the hypotheses to be tested. However, instead of considering the preferences 
and relative power of each shareholding country, as these authors do, we suggest a 
simplification: dividing shareholder countries into those that borrow from the MDBs, and 
those that do not. While all countries have their own particular interests and agendas, the 
dichotomy between borrowing and non-borrowing countries is particularly important in 
the context of an MDB, defining two major groups of shareholders that will tend to have 
divergent interests. Borrowing governments will want MDBs to supply loans and 
advisory services at as low a cost as possible, with minimum bureaucratic hassles and the 
least possible limitations on the freedom of the borrowing government. Non-borrowing 
countries, by contrast, will seek to impose their own ideas about development on 
borrowers, implement strict control on how resources are spent, and reduce the risk of 
MDB financial difficulties that they would have to pay for out of their guaranteed capital. 
The relative power of those two groups, we hypothesize, is a critical feature shaping how 
each MDB operates and the competitive advantages it has from the point of view of 
borrowing countries. 
                                                             
5 A second critical resource is access to private capital markets—an issue incorporated into the theoretical 
framework, but not used as a dependent variable in this paper. 
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Focusing on more than one MDB is obviously necessary to compare the effect of 
different MDB governance structures. The World Bank, IADB and CAF each represent a 
different breakdown between borrowing and non-borrowing shareholders. The World 
Bank is controlled by wealthy non-borrowing countries (“donor dominant”), the IADB 
has more influence by borrowing countries but is still ultimately under the final control 
of non-borrowers (“donor predominant”), and the CAF is entirely controlled by the same 
countries that borrow from it (“borrower dominant”).  
To facilitate the comparison, we geographically focus on Latin America where all three 
banks operate in a largely overlapping set of countries. Latin America includes mainly 
middle-income countries, so that the division of labor within the World Bank, between 
the IBRD and the International Development Agency (IDA), is less relevant here.6 
Moreover, Latin America is a particularly interesting market for development lending, as 
many countries have gone from a position of extreme crisis and dependence on MDBs 
during the 1980s to a position of relative strength more recently. As we will argue, the 
effect of the different MDB governance structures should become most obvious under 
changing economic conditions, making Latin America an appropriate context for our 
analysis. The applicability of this framework to other MDBs operating in other parts of 
the world is plausible, but would require further research to test.  
Because the World Bank is dominated by non-borrowing industrialized countries,7 it can 
access capital markets at highly favorable terms for its bonds, and hence has a steady 
stream of lendable capital at terms well below what many borrowing countries normally 
get on private markets. At the same time, non-borrowing shareholders have numerous 
agendas that differ from borrowers, notably project oversight issues (environmental, 
social and procurement safeguards) and loan conditionality based on their views of 
development and their political interests. As well, the high number and competing 
agendas of multiple non-borrowing shareholders lead to multiple layers of bureaucracy 
and extremely slow loan approval time. Hence, countries will tend to reduce borrowing 
from the World Bank when their options for sovereign financing (both private and 
multilateral) increase, and when their borrowing needs decrease. For Latin American 
countries that, on average, have shown positive fiscal and developmental trends since the 
1980s, this should lead to a general long-term trend away from World Bank lending. 
The shift away from the World Bank will be even more pronounced during boom years, 
when a country has less need for borrowing and/or greater access to alternative sources 
of capital at more attractive terms. In times of crisis, however, the World Bank will be 
best positioned to supply loans to help countries face financial difficulties due to its 
unparalleled access to global capital markets, and may also provide a positive signaling 
effect that can help “crowd in” private investment.  
                                                             
6 As detailed in the annex, we include IDA lending to Bolivia in our data, as well as concessional IADB 
lending to several Latin American countries. The magnitude of concessional lending to the countries and time 
period under study is quite small and does not significantly impact the results. The CAF recently launched a 
slightly concessional lending window, but volumes are extremely small and are thus not considered here. 
7 In 2009, non-borrowing members had 63.08% of overall voting power, and of that, the US had 16.36%. The 
US share constitutes veto power over major changes to structure and policy, such as changing share sizes, 
amending the articles of agreement and capital increases.  
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The borrower-dominated CAF, by contrast, does not have major industrialized countries 
as shareholders,8 and as a result has weaker access to capital markets. Hence the financial 
terms of its loans are necessarily less attractive than the World Bank’s. On the other 
hand, because it is controlled by the very nations it lends to, the CAF has no incentive to 
impose the onerous safeguards and policy conditionality that many countries object to in 
World Bank operations, nor any reason to build up the multiple bureaucratic layers of 
checks and balances that are so cumbersome at the World Bank. As a result, one can 
expect that the long-term trend of lending by Latin American countries will move 
towards the CAF as opposed to the World Bank. This effect should be further 
strengthened as the CAF itself grows in financial strength and gains greater access to 
international capital markets at increasingly better terms. Over and above the general 
trend, there should be a shift of lending towards the CAF in boom economic conditions 
when countries have lower borrowing needs and greater access to private funds at a 
reasonable cost. Even if the CAF rates are still higher than the World Bank rates during a 
boom in a specific country, that country may prefer to pay a premium interest rate for its 
limited borrowing needs simply to avoid dealing with the conditionality and safeguards 
of the World Bank. In times of crisis, however, CAF borrowing costs on private markets 
are likely to rise considerably, thus reducing the attractiveness of CAF loans.  
The IADB occupies an intermediate position between the World Bank and the CAF in 
terms of shareholding structure, with borrowers controlling a slim majority of voting 
power on individual loan approvals, but with industrialized nations led by the US able to 
veto any changes to IADB policies and organizational structure.9 Thus the IADB is likely 
to enjoy some of the same advantages as the World Bank in terms of access to capital 
markets and low cost, and also some of the disadvantages such as greater bureaucracy, 
safeguards and loan conditionality. Because of the IADB’s “Latin” character, with most 
of its staff being from the region’s political and economic elite, loan preparation and 
negotiation might, however, be smoother. Hence, over the long term and during boom 
economic times for borrowers, the IADB is expected to see lending rise more (or 
decrease less) than the World Bank. However, it should not rise as much as for the CAF. 
Conversely, during crisis years, IADB lending should increase more than CAF lending, 
but less than World Bank lending.   
We can sum up the above discussion with the following hypotheses: 
MDBs tend to lend more or less in different economic conditions, for reasons 
that derive in large measure from the composition of their shareholders into 
different governance “types”: 
1. Under conditions of generally positive fiscal and developmental trends 
in their borrowing countries, as a long-term trend the World Bank 
(donor dominant MDB) will experience a decline in lending, the CAF 
                                                             
8 Spain recently joined as CAF shareholders, but it holds only subordinate (“C” class) shares and hence has 
very limited voting power.  
9 IADB borrowers had 50.015% of voting power in 2009. As with the World Bank, the US share of 30.006% 
constitutes veto power over major changes, such as changing share sizes, amending the articles of agreement 
and capital increases. 
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(borrower dominant MDB) will experience an increasing trend, and the 
IADB (donor predominant) will find itself in between.  
2. In times of crisis, the World Bank and, to a lesser degree the IADB, will 
show an increase in lending, while CAF lending will increase less or 
even decrease.  
3. In boom times, the World Bank will lend below the normal trend, and 
less than the CAF. The IADB will again remain in an intermediate 
position.  
 
III. Descriptive Statistics 
To gain an initial idea about the plausibility of our hypotheses, we look at descriptive 
statistics for (i) all major Latin American economies,10 and (ii), more specifically, for the 
five Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela that are the core 
clients and original member states of the CAF.11  
Lending information is based on annual loan commitments, measured in constant 2007 
US$ and taken from the annual reports of each of the three MDBs. Commitments are the 
best indicator of how much a given country at a given moment wants to borrow from an 
MDB, and the amount an MDB is willing to lend. By contrast, loan disbursements are 
often stretched out over several years, so that the actual payments cannot be directly 
related to demand and supply based on economic conditions prevailing at any fixed point 
in time.  
In order to identify economic conditions of booms and crises, we look at three different 
indicators, namely: (i) the overall fiscal balance of the central government as a share of 
GDP, (ii) international reserves divided by external short-term debt, and (iii) the rankings 
for sovereign borrower risk in the annual Institutional Investor index.12 The time series 
for each of these macroeconomic indicators are displayed in Figures 1-3. To identify 
global trends, we also include a series for a broader set of developing countries. 
For the most part, the most notable periods of good and bad economic conditions for 
each of the three country groupings follow patterns that one would expect in light of the 
major global economic events and trends over the past three decades. In all groupings, 
boom years of strong government finances and high private capital flows can be isolated 
                                                             
10 The 10 LAC countries used in this section, and later in the regressions, are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
11 Chile was one of the six founding members of the CAF, but withdrew its membership in 1976 under the 
leadership of General Pinochet. Chile recently rejoined the CAF. In recent years the CAF has begun 
expanding membership to other Latin American nations, which are considered in the regression analysis. 
However lending data are limited to the five Andean nations in this section, to facilitate comparisons with the 
IADB and World Bank.  
12 This index of sovereign debt risk is a consistent time series begun in 1979 and published twice a year in the 
March and September issues of Institutional Investor magazine. The methodology used is to request the 
assessment of a given country from 75 to 100 investment bank research departments, with the answers 
weighted according to the banks’ worldwide exposure and the sophistication of their country analysis 
systems. An indicator tracking the interest rate faced by a government would be ideal here, but this would 
involve finding out the interest rate a government would have had to pay to borrow from private markets, for 
both bonds and bank loans. This counter-factual cannot be realistically constructed. 
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in 1996-97 and again in 2004-06. The most distinct crisis years are apparent in 1982-83, 
in 1998-99, and in 2009. To a much lesser extent (and not visible in the investor index at 
all), we observe a slight downturn for Latin American countries around the year 1995, 
due to Mexico’s Tequila Crisis.  
 
Figure 1: Fiscal balance for MDB borrowing countries 
  
Sources: World Bank, 2009a for all Latin American countries 1980-2008; 2009 from IMF, 2010b. IMF, 
2010a (International Financial Statistics database) for non-Latin American developing countries.  
Notes: “Developing countries” comprises unweighted average of fifteen major developing countries. “LAC 
10” comprises the unweighted average of 10 Latin American economies, while “Andes” represents the 
unweighted average of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
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Figure 2: International reserves of MDB borrowing countries 
  
Source: IMF, 2010b.  
Notes: “Developing Countries” grouping generated by World Bank, 2010b (Global Development Finance 
database); “LAC” created using unweighted averages of 10 Latin American countries; “Andes” created using 
unweighted average of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador Peru and Venezuela. Data for 2009 not available.  
 
Figure 3: Institutional Investor ranking for MDB borrowing countries 
   
Source: Institutional Investor, 1980-2009.  
Notes: “Developing countries” is the unweighted averages of 15 major developing countries; LAC is the 
unweighted average of ten Latin American economies; and “Andes” is the unweighted average of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
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We now compare these time periods with trends in MDB lending, first reviewing the 
lending of the World Bank and IADB in all of Latin America (Figure 4), and second 
comparing the lending of all three MDBs in the five countries of the Andean region—
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela (Figure 5).  
The comparison of World Bank and IADB lending commitments in Latin America 
appears to be generally consistent with our hypotheses. The prediction that the IADB 
should out-lend the World Bank over the long run and particularly during periods of 
positive economic circumstances among borrowers (1996-97 and 2004-06) appears to 
hold true. It is notable that the IADB’s lending is only marginally above the World Bank 
in both cases, though. This suggests that whatever may be driving the growing 
supremacy of the IADB over the World Bank as a multilateral lender in Latin America, 
the World Bank is still a highly important source of development lending in the region.  
 
Figure 4: Latin American and Caribbean annual sovereign lending commitments 
  
Sources: World Bank, 1980-2009a, and IADB, 1980-2009. 
The evidence for crises periods is somewhat mixed. During times of major crisis after 
1990 (1998-99 and 2009), lending by both the IADB and World Bank rose, although 
contrary to expectations the IADB actually committed more loans than the World Bank. 
The same is true for the smaller crisis in 1995. However, the crisis in the early 1980s 
(1982-83) is not reflected in the World Bank lending series at all.  
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We also observe a major decline IADB lending just after the crisis of the early 1980s, 
which the historical record indicates is due to political rather than economic 
determinants. In fact, during the mid and late 1980s, the Reagan administration held up a 
much-needed capital increase for the IADB because of major disagreements with then-
IADB president Antonio Ortiz Mena and a number of borrowing countries. This led to a 
sharp downturn in lending evident in the mid 1980s. In 1988, Ortiz Mena resigned and a 
deal was brokered by incoming president Enrique Iglesias to complete the capital 
increase, and lending began returning to the previous trend by 1990.  
The five countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela constitute the 
region for which lending commitments by all three MDBs can be most directly 
compared. By the late 1990s, the CAF had established a clear and widening superiority in 
annual lending commitments in the Andes, with the IADB in the second position and the 
World Bank lending the least of the three. These outcomes are in line with our 
hypotheses. Evidently, the higher costs attached to CAF sovereign loans compared to the 
other two MDBs are offset by other advantages that lead countries to prefer its loans over 
the IADB and, especially, the World Bank. 
 
Figure 5: Andes annual sovereign lending commitments 
 
Sources: World Bank, 1980-2009a, IADB, 1980-2009, and CAF, 1980-2009a and 2009b.  
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lending and that of the World Bank grew noticeably during the boom years of the mid-
0 
500 
1000 
1500 
2000 
2500 
3000 
3500 
4000 
4500 
19
80
 
19
81
 
19
82
 
19
83
 
19
84
 
19
85
 
19
86
 
19
87
 
19
88
 
19
89
 
19
90
 
19
91
 
19
92
 
19
93
 
19
94
 
19
95
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
20
09
 
M
ill
io
ns
 2
00
7 
U
S$
 
World 
Bank 
IADB 
CAF 
12 
 
2000s and also (although less clearly so) during 1996-1997. The gap between the CAF 
and the IADB during boom years was narrower but also apparent—again in line with 
expectations.13  
During the crisis years of 1998-99, IADB lending in the Andes rose as predicted, but 
World Bank lending actually fell during those years. The credit crunch of 2009 did 
trigger a notable increase in World Bank lending in the Andes, but again less than the 
IADB. The dip in CAF lending commitments in the late 1990s is consistent with the 
hypothesis that during times of crises the CAF will be a less successful lender, because 
of its more limited and expensive access to capital markets compared to the AAA-rated 
World Bank and IADB. The lending drop off in 2008 is also consistent with this, as 
global credit markets began tightening, but the subsequent spike in 2009 is not. However, 
in the descriptive, graphical analysis, it is not possible to clearly distinguish this increase 
from the CAF’s long-term trend of increased lending.  
 
IV. Estimation methodology and regression results 
The previous graphical overview provides us with an initial illustration of the situation at 
hand, and with some tentative evidence for the hypotheses derived in Section II. 
However, in this simple framework we could neither control for the influence of 
additional variables that may interfere with the effects we are interested in, nor could we 
distinguish between regional or global developments, and effects related to the economic 
development in individual countries. A multivariate framework can help address these 
issues.  
In the following, we first provide more details on the specification of the explanatory 
variables and the selection of the econometric estimation strategy. Second, we present the 
corresponding results with respect to the central hypotheses derived in Section II. And 
third, we point to some interesting complementary outcomes related to the policy 
controls included in the regressions. 
a. Variable specification and choice of estimation models 
To derive the hypothesis on the relationship between lending and economic 
developments, Section II employs arguments related to booms and busts at both the 
national and the global level. This distinction requires further explanation in order to 
motivate our operationalization.  
                                                             
13 The spike in IADB Andes lending in 2003 is due entirely to more than US$2 billion in loans to Colombia 
that year, while lending in the rest of the Andes did not fluctuate notably compared to 2002 or 2004. The 
reasons behind that particularly large loan are not clear—Colombia also showed a striking jump in 
disbursements from private creditors that year. While the country did run a fairly large budget deficit that 
year (4.2% of GDP), it was actually smaller than the previous five years, and international reserves did not 
show a major shift either. Possibly the increased demand was related to the incoming Uribe administration’s 
counter-insurgency effort.  
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On the one hand, the difference in MDB financing costs—and hence its loan price—is 
expected to vary as a function of global or at least regional developments. As argued 
before, the World Bank is thought to benefit from the best conditions on international 
financial markets, closely followed by IADB, while the CAF should pay a markedly 
higher price. We expect the price differential between the banks to be narrower in 
general boom times, while it should widen during global downturns.  
On the other hand, a country’s individual economic situation is also thought to play a 
role. If an individual country faces a particularly bad economic downturn, it may turn to 
the World Bank not just because of loan cost, but also to signal its willingness to change 
policies, and accept policy conditionality either as a condition to access needed funding 
or as part of a truly intended policy change. In situations of relative strength, borrower 
governments tend to conceive policy conditionality as an undue interference of foreign 
powers with their national authority. Thus when an individual country faces a boom, it 
requires relatively little external finance, and for the limited amount required, it may be 
willing to turn to slightly more expensive financing options if they allow the government 
to avoid policy interference. 
We therefore include crisis and boom variables at both the country and the global (or 
regional) level into our regression analysis. The former refer to the individual country’s 
booms or financial crises, and the latter are expressed as dummy variables for general 
boom or bust periods, simply reflecting the periods highlighted in the previous section.  
Country-level indicators for crises and booms are derived from information on deficits, 
international reserves and investor rankings for each individual country. We consider that 
a country is in a financial crisis if it meets at least two out of the following three 
conditions: (i) a deficit ≥ 5% of GDP, (ii) reserves/short term external debt ≤ 0.5, and 
(iii) an Institutional Investor ranking ≤ 20 (out of 100). While these thresholds are 
somewhat arbitrary, they are informed by what is generally considered acceptable in the 
literature (see, e.g., IMF, 2000), by EU rules and regulations (e.g., the limitation of the 
deficit to 3% in the Stability and Growth Pact), and by the magazine’s own interpretation 
of its rankings.14 Moreover, we carried out robustness checks by moving the thresholds 
towards weaker crises, but this did not bring about any substantive change in our results. 
We found it more difficult to find guidance with respect to the threshold for country-level 
booms. We decided to define this indicator only as a function of international reserves, 
whereby we consider as a boom when a country increases its reserves by more than 10% 
within a single year, starting from a reserve level above average. Again, changing this 
indicator in different ways does not substantially alter the results. 
Only our first hypothesis on the general time trend towards the CAF, away from the 
World Bank, and in between the other two for the IADB, does not require any 
                                                             
14 Institutional Investor considers that a ranking below 20 means a country cannot access international private 
credit at any price. 
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complementary specification at the individual country level. We use a simple count 
variable, the year of observation, to depict the annual trend. 
Further details on these and all other variables used in the regression are provided in 
Annex 1. 
Conceptually, our argumentation is based on the idea that for any Latin American 
country, borrowing from the World Bank, the CAF and/or the IADB must be considered 
as joint decisions, because these banks compete in a common market. This also has 
consequences for the choice of our regression model. If lending by different MDBs is not 
determined independently from each other, this information can be taken into account to 
obtain more efficient regression estimates. We therefore use seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation (SURE) that allows error terms to be correlated across equations. 
As our hypotheses also require a comparison of the effects of crises, booms and trend 
variables for the different MDBs, we further test for differences in the respective 
coefficients across regression equations, using Wald tests.  
Tables 1 and 2 present the SURE results for two different sets of control variables. While 
Table 1 only includes GDP per capita, Table 2 further includes three policy variables that 
will be discussed in more detail below. We also consider a number of other controls, 
such as: information on MDB loan cost for the borrower, the international interest rate 
(approximated by the rate for US treasury bonds), population size, world growth, and a 
dummy for the Reagan administration blocking IADB refunding in the late 1980s (cf. 
Section III). For the most part, they are totally insignificant.15 The only exception is 
population, but it turns out that this is primarily due to a strong time trend that we prefer 
to capture with a simple annual trend variable. The relevant differences in country size 
are captured by country fixed effects. 
The lack of any significance of information on loan cost may be more surprising. More 
general developments of loan cost related to economic and financial crises or booms 
should be captured by those variables designed to test our hypotheses. However, there is 
important MDB-specific variation in fees and interest rate for different lending products 
that is not directly related to these global economic developments. The problem may be 
that we do not have comparable time series information on MDB-specific interest rates.16 
Thus even when we include the available information on commitment and front-end fees, 
price information remains incomplete.  
 
                                                             
15 This matches Ratha’s (1999) finding on the demand for World Bank lending. 
16 MDB lending rates are not easily comparable either to one another or even for the same MDB in a time 
series, as the type and terms of loans have changed numerous times over the years, with several options 
(single currency or currency pool; local currency; fixed, adjustable or Libor-based; different maturities; etc.). 
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Table 1: Regression specification 1 – SURE 
    
 
World Bank lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
CAF lending in 
million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
IADB lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
Annual trend -7.70  15.54 *** 14.96 ** 
 (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Country crisis -275.96  -14.34  41.96  
 (0.17)  (0.80)  (0.84)  
DU_1982_83 -175.85  44.72  64.24  
 (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.64)  
DU_1995 12.89  10.18  268.21  
 (0.94)  (0.83)  (0.13)  
DU_1998_99 161.70  -47.74  489.64 *** 
 (0.19)  (0.17)  (0.00)  
DU_2009 734.69 *** 240.52 *** 471.08 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02)  
Country boom -152.60 * 32.86  133.93  
 (0.08)  (0.18)  (0.15)  
DU_1996_97 -81.37  -1.28  66.48  
 (0.51)  (0.97)  (0.60)  
DU_2004_06 40.43  58.46 * -125.09  
 (0.73)  (0.07)  (0.30)  
GDP per capita -0.04  -0.03 *** -0.04  
 (0.14)  (0.00)  (0.25)  
N 300  300  300  
T 30  30  30  
R² 64%  58%  44%  
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: Chi2(3)=3.74, p=0.29  
 Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; p-values in parentheses. All 
regressions include country fixed effects. Coefficients of fixed effects and constant are not shown. 
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Table 2: Regression specification 2 – SURE including policy controls 
  
 
World Bank 
lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
CAF lending 
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
IADB lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
Annual trend -13.15 * 18.96 *** 22.37 *** 
 (0.08)  (0.00)  (0.01)  
Country crisis -6.55  -17.27  438.38  
 (0.98)  (0.79)  (0.17)  
DU_1982_83 -211.70  71.11  39.61  
 (0.23)  (0.16)  (0.84)  
DU_1995 -45.33  16.09  163.66  
 (0.79)  (0.74)  (0.37)  
DU_1998_99 158.36  -53.75  364.95 *** 
 (0.23)  (0.13)  (0.01)  
DU_2009 875.10 *** 216.76 *** 413.17 ** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.05)  
Country boom -69.50  2.59  143.56  
 (0.50)  (0.93)  (0.20)  
DU_1996_97 -135.02  6.30  -54.68  
 (0.28)  (0.86)  (0.69)  
DU_2004_06 101.68  46.17  -71.78  
 (0.38)  (0.16)  (0.57)  
GDP per capita -0.03  -0.04 *** -0.04  
 (0.39)  (0.00)  (0.26)  
Inflation -0.07    -0.10 ** 
 (0.11)    (0.03)  
UN voting with US -77.26    197.46 ** 
 (0.36)    (0.03)  
Government ideology -210.20 ***   -89.43  
 (0.00)    (0.12)  
N 270  270  270  
T 27  27  27  
R² 66%  60%  47%  
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: Chi2(3)=3.22, p=0.35  
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; p-values in parentheses. All 
regressions include country fixed effects. Coefficients of fixed effects and constant are not shown. 
 
Table 3 replicates the SURE regressions of Table 2 using the same set of variables, but 
independent regressions for each bank. While conceptually the equations for the three 
banks should be related, the Breusch-Pagan test (see results under Table 1 and 2) does 
not reject independence as soon as we enter a relevant number of explanatory variables 
and controls. The independent estimation allows us to more easily include panel 
corrected standard errors and a panel adjusted Prais-Winston correction for first order 
serial correlation. This robustness check appears important, as the Baltagi-Li test for first 
order serial correlation suggests that we do have a certain autocorrelation problem. 
Generally, our setting with only ten countries and a (relatively) large T calls for taking 
the time series properties seriously. Moreover, the data structure suggests considering the 
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possible correlations of error terms across panels, for any given year (along with our 
country fixed effects taking into account similarities within panels). 
 
Table 3: Regression specification 3 –  individual PCSE regressions  
 
 
World Bank 
lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
CAF lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
IADB lending  
in million US$ 
(const. 2007) 
Annual trend -11.11 ** 13.21 *** 21.56 *** 
 (0.05)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Country crisis -69.23  -61.03  398.37 * 
 (0.73)  (0.42)  (0.09)  
DU_1982_83 -146.93  5.52  29.36  
 (0.16)  (0.84)  (0.79)  
DU_1995 -14.04  7.43  165.85  
 (0.89)  (0.81)  (0.10)  
DU_1998_99 172.12 ** -52.42 * 382.98 *** 
 (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.00)  
DU_2009 853.10 *** 215.21 *** 408.34 *** 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Country boom -71.28  -7.88  139.01  
 (0.50)  (0.69)  (0.24)  
DU_1996_97 -119.06  -5.84  -46.34  
 (0.15)  (0.85)  (0.56)  
DU_2004_06 87.72  62.45 ** -80.50  
 (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.27)  
GDP per capita -0.03  -0.02  -0.04  
 (0.22)  (0.19)  (0.20)  
Inflation -0.05    -0.10 ** 
 (0.14)    (0.02)  
UN voting with US -67.96    172.53 ** 
 (0.34)    (0.01)  
Government ideology -199.87 ***   -88.36  
 (0.00)    (0.13)  
N 270  300  270  
T 27  30  27  
R² 60%  34%  43%  
Notes: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level; p-values in parentheses. All 
regressions include country fixed effects. Coefficients of fixed effects and constant are not shown. The 
regressions in this table are corrected for first order serial correlation (using a panel adjusted Prais Winsten 
approach). 
 
We now discuss the results for our main explanatory variables, and then turn to some 
interesting outcomes with respect to our control variables.  
b. Evidence for differences in lending conditional on economic developments 
18 
 
According to Hypothesis 1, we should expect a general downward trend for World Bank 
lending, an upward trend for CAF lending, and something in between for IADB lending. 
Regressions coefficients in all three tables confirm those trends for the World Bank and 
the CAF. All estimates are significant, or at least close to significant (World Bank 
regression in Table 1). However, the IADB does not lie in between the two other MDBs. 
Over the full period from 1980 to 2009, its upward trend is about as strong as the CAF. 
The Wald test comparing the annual trend coefficients for the CAF and the IADB does 
reject that they are equal for either Table 1 or Table 2. In Table 3, the positive trend for 
IADB lending even appears substantially stronger than for the CAF. Thus, Hypothesis 1 
finds clear support for the expected relationship between World Bank and CAF, and 
between World Bank and IADB (with absolute and relative downward trends for the 
World Bank in both cases). However, the upward trend of IADB lending is stronger than 
predicted, so that the comparison between IADB and CAF does not yield the expected 
result. 
According to Hypothesis 2, countries tend to turn towards the World Bank in times of 
financial and economic crisis, while the IADB and the CAF are only second and third 
best options, respectively. As countries generally require more financial resources during 
such periods, this hypothesis does not imply that only the coefficient for World Bank 
lending should be positive. However, it leads us to expect that the coefficient for the 
World Bank should clearly be significantly different from zero, and significantly greater 
than the coefficient for the IADB and for the CAF. Moreover, the coefficient for the 
IADB should be significantly greater (which may also mean significantly less negative) 
than the one for the CAF.  
Let us first consider national crises. At given levels of the international economy, 
individual country crises do not show the expected positive effect on the volume of 
World Bank lending. The coefficient is insignificant and negative in all three 
specifications. It is positive only for IADB, and significantly so in Table 3. The size of 
the coefficient increases substantially in the models that control for policy variables 
(Tables 2 and 3). However, given the high standard errors for the coefficient of the 
country crises in the CAF and the World Bank regressions, a Wald test comparing these 
coefficients with the coefficient in the IADB regression cannot reject that they are equal. 
Thus, even that part of our hypothesis, suggesting that, ceteris paribus, in such situations 
the IADB should be lending more than the CAF does not find any clear statistical 
support. All in all, the expected incentive for governments to turn towards the World 
Bank first, the IADB second, and the CAF third during national economic crises does not 
find any reflection in our data.  
We consider now whether the situation is different when we look at global or regional 
crises, which are expected to widen the gap between the refinancing costs of the three 
banks. In this context, we look at four different periods of crises: 1982-83, 1995, 1998-
99, and 2009. Again, our hypothesis leads us to expect that the coefficient for the World 
Bank should clearly be significantly different from zero, and significantly greater than 
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the coefficient for the IADB and for the CAF. Moreover, the coefficient for the IADB 
should be significantly greater than the one for the CAF.  
The first two crisis periods considered are not in line with this expectation. At the same 
time, we might want to concede that 1995 is a crisis, which mainly hit a single country, 
namely Mexico, while the 1982-83 crisis came up at a time where the CAF was still in an 
embryonic stage as a multilateral lender. The other two crises meet both criteria: they are 
truly international and the CAF is fully operational. And here, we do indeed find 
relatively strong evidence for our hypothesis.  
The year 2009 corresponds fully to our predictions. The coefficients are strongly positive 
and significant for the World Bank in all regression specifications. While the coefficients 
for CAF and IADB are also significantly different from zero, they are substantially 
smaller, with the CAF coefficient being the smallest. A Wald test confirms that all of 
these differences are jointly significant at the 5% level. 
The period 1998-99 shows a smaller and less clearly significant coefficient for the World 
Bank. It is, in fact, significant only in Table 3. However, the difference to the (negative) 
CAF coefficient is significant throughout. This provides support for our hypothesis. 
Equally in line with our hypothesis, IADB lending increases significantly more than CAF 
lending during this period. However, just as with respect to the time trend discussed 
above, IADB lending is stronger than expected, with a coefficient much higher than for 
the World Bank (and significantly so for the regression specifications in Table 1). 
All in all, we can conclude that Hypothesis 2 does find some support as far as global 
crises are concerned. The price of lending depending on global economic developments 
appears to play a stronger role than individual governments’ wishes to signal their policy 
change in times of pure country-level crises. But even for global economic crises, the 
role of the IADB is partially unexpected. In 1998-99, its rise in lending is stronger than 
for the World Bank, a result which is not in line with our hypothesis and similar to the 
unexpectedly strong time trend observed for the IADB in the context of Hypothesis 1. 
Turning to Hypothesis 3 on economic booms, we again distinguish between situations 
generated by country-level and global upswings. Rather than to simply provide the flip-
side of what we have just observed for busts, the individual country situation during a 
boom seems to be more in line with our hypothesis. What we expect is that during 
economic booms, countries will tend to avoid the World Bank, and be drawn most, if at 
all, towards the CAF.  
Indeed the coefficient for country booms is negative in the World Bank regressions, 
although it is significantly different from zero only as long as no policy controls are 
entered into the model (Table 1). Equally in line with our hypothesis, it is significantly 
smaller than the corresponding coefficient in the IADB equation, and also smaller than 
the coefficient in the CAF equation, although the latter difference is not statistically 
significant due to the relatively high standard error for the CAF.  
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Again, we observe that IADB lending runs counter our expectations in that it does not 
significantly differ from CAF lending during country booms. The size of the coefficients 
in fact suggests that, if at all, countries tend to turn towards the IADB rather than towards 
the CAF in such situations. But in any case, our evidence is consistent with the argument 
that governments receive less money from the World Bank when the national economy 
booms. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish whether this is really driven by demand-
side considerations (governments avoiding the World Bank in times of booms) or simply 
by the fact that the World Bank itself avoids lending to countries as long as they have 
other options. 
Global level upswings do not seem to result in the same effect. For the two periods 
observed (1996-97 and 2004-06), the coefficients for the three different MDBs vary 
widely, are largely insignificant, and also insignificant when compared to each other. The 
only exception is CAF lending during the 2004-06 period, which indeed significantly 
increases during this boom period—in line with our hypothesis. However, we cannot 
statistically establish a clear difference to World Bank lending for which the coefficient 
is similarly high or even higher (without, however, being significantly different from 
zero). 
All in all, the empirical evidence provides mixed support for our hypotheses. Comparing 
World Bank and CAF lending, the expectations about the overall time trend as well as on 
the effect of global level crises and country-level booms are broadly confirmed. Evidence 
for the effect of country-level crises and global booms is less supportive. And finally, the 
IADB seems to be much more relevant in overall lending than expected in any of the 
three hypotheses. 
c. Additional regression outcomes 
Let us finally consider our control variables. In all our specifications, we include GDP 
per capita, which turns out to be significant or close to significant in many regressions. It 
is an indicator of economic need and should thus reflect some country-specific demand 
side considerations that are less volatile than economic business cycles. The coefficients 
are about equal for the three MDBs and relatively small—implying that a difference of 
US$ 1000 in GDP per capita (PPP) would typically lead to a difference of around 
USS$30 million in lending by each of the banks (with the poorer countries receiving 
more lending). While the coefficients appear more clearly significant for the CAF than 
for the two other banks in Tables 1 and 2, this is an artifact of general economic recovery 
in several Latin American countries coinciding with the CAF becoming fully operational. 
When serial correlation driven by continuous zero lending of the CAF to a number of 
countries during the 1980s is controlled for in Table 3 (or when the 1980s are deleted 
from the sample) the effect is no more significant for the CAF.  
Other predominantly economic variables we included in some prior regressions (not 
presented here) did not show any significant effect at all. However, policy variables 
(national inflation rates, voting with the US in the UN General Assembly, and 
government ideology) clearly increase the explanatory power of the model. Just as 
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suggested in the discussion on governance structures and donor agendas, these variables 
are relevant determinants of lending commitments only for the World Bank and the 
IADB.  
Both the World Bank and the IADB appear to negatively consider high inflation rates, 
which they may interpret as a signal of bad financial governance. While the effect just 
fails to be significant at conventional levels for the World Bank, it is clearly significant 
for the IADB. Only the CAF does not seem to consider financial governance at all. 
Borrower country inflation rates are fully insignificant in any CAF regression, and thus 
left out in the final specification presented in the paper. 
The other two variables can be considered as measures of the political inclination of the 
government. UN voting, especially on votes that the US considers strategic, is frequently 
used in this context in prior studies to test linkages with US influence in multilateral 
institutions.17 The ideology variable we include18 could capture a similar effect, and 
could also indicate a tendency for a government to have economic policies in line with 
(=right-leaning) or contrary to (=left-leaning) orthodox World Bank policy prescriptions. 
Correspondingly, the World Bank seems to react most strongly to this ideology effect, 
with left-wing governments receiving significantly fewer loans. While this tendency can 
be observed for the IADB as well, the coefficient is much smaller and not fully 
significant. IADB lending, however, appears to be strongly related to UN voting with the 
US. In our regression specification this is not evident for the World Bank. Neither of the 
two variables is significant in any way for the CAF, so they are not included in the final 
specification. 
We can conclude that, in one way or the other, both World Bank and IADB lending is 
significantly influenced by policy variables proxying political leanings of borrowing 
governments. The fact that US interests are more apparent at the IADB could be 
explained by the US’s clearly dominant role in that MDB, with one-third of voting power 
and hence a greater ability to exercise its national interests via the IADB. The World 
Bank, on the other hand, is somewhat more insulated (though far from entirely, of 
course) from direct US pressure due to the greater diversity of non-borrowing 
shareholders and greater financial independence. At the same time, however, the World 
Bank is much more the “keeper of the flame” of economic policy orthodoxy than the 
IADB, and may as a result react more strongly to left-leaning political governments.  
Alternatively, one could, of course, argue from a demand-side perspective. Left-leaning 
governments could themselves be more averse to borrowing from the World Bank, and 
governments with anti-US foreign policy might be averse to borrowing from the IADB. 
                                                             
17 Different authors analyzing US influence on the behaviour of the World Bank, IMF, and Asian 
Development Bank have employed several different techniques to build proxy variables for a country’s 
relations with the US based on UN data. These include commonality of votes considered as important by the 
US State Department (Thacker, 1999); votes considered unimportant by the US State Department (Anderson 
et al. 2006); both of these in combination (Kilby, 2010), and temporary membership on the UN Security 
Council (Dreher et al., 2009a and 2009b). We follow Thacker’s methodology. 
18 This variable is based on historical information from each country, using a simple code: 1 = right-leaning, 
2 = moderate, 3 = left-leaning. 
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While our econometric estimation does not allow us to distinguish between supply and 
demand-side effects, in any case, our results demonstrate how clearly the CAF differs 
from the other two banks in this respect. As stated above, no relevance of either domestic 
policies or international voting alliances could be found for its lending. This is precisely 
what we expected in our discussion of governance structures in Section II.  
 
V. Overall results and possible extensions 
All in all, our econometric investigation largely confirms the results of the graphical 
analysis in Section III. The initially observed upward trend of CAF and IADB lending, 
along with the downward trend of World Bank lending, is robust to the inclusion of a 
number of controls in the multivariate regression analysis. In addition, econometric 
testing establishes that the differences in trends between the CAF and the IADB on the 
one hand, and the World Bank on the other hand, are clearly significant.  
The periods of global crises found to be most relevant in the graphical analysis (1998/99 
and 2009), are equally significant in the regression analysis. However, while in Figure 5 
CAF lending appeared unexpectedly strong during the 2009 crisis, this effect disappears 
when the general time trend is controlled for in the regression analysis. While still 
positive, it turns out to be significantly smaller than the peak for World Bank lending in 
the same year. This is consistent with our theoretical argument. 
In addition, the regression analysis allows us to test the theoretical argument of country-
level crises. The latter do not show the expected effect. Thus it seems that the difference 
in lending cost during global crises, rather than a borrower’s willingness to signal reform 
during national crises, which induces countries to rely disproportionally on World Bank 
and IADB lending.  
The relevance of country-level versus global economic developments appears to be 
different when it comes to booms. Here, our regression analysis reveals the expected 
effects only for national booms. This is also the strongest discrepancy between the 
regression outcomes and the graphical analysis, where global economic booms appeared 
to widen the gap between World Bank and CAF lending. The econometric tests—carried 
out after controlling for the time trend and other economic and political variables—do 
not find this effect to be significant. Rather than global booms, it thus seems to be the 
economic upswing of individual countries—with the corresponding availability of local 
resources and, possibly, a related rise in self-confidence—that lead to a significant 
widening of the gap between the anyway declining World Bank lending, and lending of 
the other two development banks.  
In the comparison of the three lending institutions, both in the graphical and in the 
econometric analysis, the evidence for the CAF and the World Bank corresponds 
relatively well to our theoretical expectations. However, in various respects, IADB 
lending is different from what we expected. It is often stronger than the World Bank in 
times of crisis, has risen as strongly over time as CAF lending, and does so despite a 
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level of donor predominance that ensures that donor interest (in particular, US interest) 
still has a strong voice, although formally less so than in the World Bank.  
In fact, as an individual donor, the US even formally has stronger power within the 
IADB than in the World Bank, and this fact is clearly reflected in our analysis. In the 
graphical illustrations of Section III, we noted a deep downturn of IADB lending during 
the mid and late 1980s, simply because the Reagan administration held up a capital 
increase. In our regression analysis, we saw that a country’s voting with the US in the 
UN General Assembly is strongly correlated with IADB lending, and even more clearly 
so than for the World Bank.  
Yet, this does not seem to discourage countries from turning towards the IADB. Possibly 
the regional image, the local staff, and the slightly less bureaucratic procedures given its 
smaller size could make the difference here. Further, the overall greater weight of 
borrowing countries in IADB governance may be sufficient to ensure that policy 
conditionality and safeguards are not as onerous as in the World Bank. As the IADB has 
a similarly high rating as the World Bank on international capital markets (both AAA), 
these advantages are complemented with the ability to offer cheap resources, much 
cheaper than the CAF. All in all, this has allowed the IADB to be the favored lender for 
Latin American countries since the mid-1990s.  
The central argument behind our hypotheses on different developments of lending across 
the three banks was their difference in governance structures. For IADB, this does not 
seem to be the main—or at least not the sole—characteristic driving the empirical results. 
In our theoretical framework, we characterized the IADB as “donor predominant”, the 
World Bank as “donor dominant” and the CAF as “borrower dominant”. Can only the 
latter two typologies be distinguished clearly enough to make predictions about their 
lending? Does the intermediate category of donor predominant banks always lean 
towards stronger lending like in the case of the IADB or does this indeed depend on the 
additional characteristics suggested above? 
To answer these questions, it would clearly be necessary to expand the analysis to other 
MDBs. This would also mitigate the general problem of just including a single case for 
each of the three governance structures. In the current setting, whatever we interpret—in 
line with our theoretical argument—as the effect of different governance structures, may 
de facto be driven by institution-specific characteristics of the CAF, the IADB and the 
World Bank. The credibility of the causal link we suggest in our theoretical argument 
would thus be greatly enhanced if similar relationships could be shown for additional 
MDBs. If other MDBs were shown to follow the same patterns, this would also exclude 
that the relationships observed are merely driven by particularities of the Latin American 
region.  
While this extension would require a substantial expansion of data collection and 
analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper, we suggest a classification of other major 
MDBs further research might want to take into account. Table 4 provides this 
information for selected MDBs that (i) have at least some borrowing countries as 
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shareholders and (ii) lend primarily to sovereign governments as opposed to the private 
sector. The distinction between different types of governance is based on the share of 
votes by non-borrowing shareholders.  
 
Table 4: MDBs by Type of Country Shareholder Arrangements 
Type MDB Votes by non-
borrowing 
shareholders (in %) 
Non-concessional 
loans (2008) 
(in US$ billion)  
World Bank 65.7 13.5 Donor 
dominant Asian 
Development Bank 
65.2   8.4 
IADB 49.9 11.1 
African 
Development Bank 
39.7   2.8 
Banco 
Centroamericáno 
de Integración 
Económica  
41   1.4 
Donor 
predominant 
Caribbean 
Development Bank 
35.9   0.297 
CAF   0   7.9 
Islamic 
Development Bank 
  0   7.2 
Borrower 
dominant 
East Africa 
Development Bank 
14.1   0.031 
Sources: World Bank 2009a, Asian Development Bank 2009, IADB 2009, African Development Bank 2009, 
Banco Centroamericáno de Integración Económica 2009, Caribbean Development Bank 2009, CAF 2009a, 
Islamic Development Bank 2009, and East Africa Development Bank 2009. 
Table 4 reveals that for each of the governance types, we can find other MDBs with 
similar distributions of votes as in the three banks considered so far. Moreover, the 
lending volumes of some of these MDBs are considerable. Nevertheless, the coexistence 
of similarly large banks with different governance structures within a given region 
appears to be relatively unique for Latin America. This may restrict the choice of 
borrower countries in other world regions—an issue one would need to take into account 
in possible comparisons.  
As we observe strong changes in the volume of lending by different MDBs over time, the 
relevance of this kind of analysis is likely to rise. In various regions of the world, the 
World Bank is no longer the only relevant lender. As we have seen for Latin America, 
the IADB is the dominant lender now, and for the subgroup of the Andean countries, the 
dominant lender in terms of overall volumes is the CAF.  
Lending is the core business of MDBs, required for their own access to financial 
resources, ensuring their survival and providing a certain degree of independence from 
their shareholders. Thus, changing demand for MDB loans must be expected to affect 
their behavior. Do they compete with one another and private capital to make loans, and 
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if so, how? How might this competition affect the developmental impact of their 
operations? Does this lead to tensions between staff and shareholders, or among different 
groups of shareholders? Will this eventually lead to adjustments of governance 
structures? All of these questions may be of interest for future research. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examined the development of annual lending commitments of three 
multilateral development banks—the World Bank, the IADB and the CAF—from 1980 
to 2009. Based on theoretical arguments about borrower preferences, we suggest that 
lending varies systematically as a function of the type of shareholder arrangement in each 
MDB: borrower dominant (CAF), donor predominant (IADB), and donor dominant 
(World Bank). Moreover, we expect the operational characteristics of each MDB derived 
from these shareholder arrangements to condition the pattern of their lending in different 
economic circumstances. 
Using aggregate descriptive statistics as well as multivariate econometric analysis based 
on SURE and panel regressions, and data for all major Latin American economies, we 
find that indeed, the overall trend in lending as well as their lending in specific situations 
of economic booms or crises differs considerably among the three banks. Over time, 
CAF and IADB lending increased steadily, while World Bank lending declined. When 
individual countries benefit from economic booms, this trend is reinforced. That is, 
whatever little funding they still need to borrow during such periods, they will tend to 
borrow from the CAF or the IADB rather than from the World Bank. At times of global 
economic crises, however, the World Bank and the IADB expand their lending 
commitments significantly compared to the CAF. 
These results are in line with our theoretical expectation that the donor dominant 
governance structure of the World Bank, and the bureaucratic and policy stipulations that 
come along with this structure, lead countries to seek alternative creditors. These 
alternatives are easier to find when the countries’ economy is in good shape. During 
global economic crisis, however, donor (pre-) dominant banks can make use of their 
better access to private financial markets and ensure lending at much better rates. They 
are therefore the preferred creditors during such periods.  
In contrast to our expectations, the IADB is a particularly relevant lender both during 
individual boom years and during global crises. Moreover, the increase of its lending 
over the last 20 years is about as strong as for the CAF. This is even more surprising as 
the influence of donors, notably of the biggest donor (the US) is clearly visible in the 
empirical analysis. We suggest that the result may be linked, on the one hand, to the 
IADB’s AAA rating that allows it to obtain funding on international capital markets at 
about the same rate as the World Bank. On the other hand, it may appear more attractive 
through its regional image, local staff and less bureaucratic procedures. 
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All in all, the findings of this study illustrate that MDBs are impacted not just by 
geopolitical considerations, development ideology or bureaucratic pathologies, but also 
by the evolving demand for their loans. The research also illustrates the great financial 
importance of MDBs other than the World Bank in some parts of the world—the IADB 
lends more than the World Bank in Latin America, and the CAF lends more than the 
other two in the Andean region. Given that lending is the central business for MDBs, an 
important activity ensuring their own financial and institutional sustainability, strong 
shifts in the relative role of individual institutions—as we observe them for Latin 
America—must be expected to influence their operations, the way they interact with each 
other, and the role of their shareholders. This could, in turn, have important implications 
for the ability of non-borrowing countries to exercise influence on policy in the region.  
The study thus provides a useful starting point for further research on a number of other 
questions on how evolving demand for multilateral lending may be impacting different 
MDBs. The analysis could also be extended beyond the three MDBs considered here. 
Since we find comparable MDBs for all three shareholder governance types, this would 
only require the collection of corresponding data on these organizations. The extension 
of the analysis could provide an important step to further examine the plausibility of our 
causal theoretical arguments, and to explore to what extent our results can be generalized 
beyond Latin America.  
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Annex Table 1: Variables 
Variable Name Description Source 
World Bank lending Annual World Bank sovereign lending 
commitments in each fiscal year, in millions 
2007 USD. In the single case of Bolivia, this 
variable includes a limited amount of IDA 
lending. No other country received IDA 
lending during the period under review.  
World Bank, 1980-2009.  
IADB lending Annual IADB sovereign lending commitments 
in each fiscal year, in millions 2007 USD. 
Includes both non-concessional (OC) and 
concessional (FSO) loans, although OC 
lending is much higher in all countries except 
Bolivia for the entire period.  
IADB, 1980-2009. 
CAF lending Annual CAF sovereign lending commitments 
in each fiscal year, in millions 2007 USD.  
CAF, 1980-2009a and 2009b.  
Fiscal balance Government annual fiscal balance (surplus) as 
a share of GDP. 
World Bank, 2009a for all 
Latin American countries 
1980-2008; IMF, 2010b for 
2009 data. 
Reserves International reserves in 2007 US$. World Bank, 2010b; IMF 
2010b for 2009 data. 
Institutional Investor 
rank 
Ranking on the semi-annual Institutional 
Investor index of investor sentiment 
Institutional Investor, 1980-
2009. 
Reserves to debt International reserves as a share of short-term 
external debt. 
World Bank, 2010b. 
Country crisis  Dummy = 1 if a country meets at least two out 
of the three conditions: (i) a fiscal deficit ≥ 
5% of GDP, (ii) reserves/short term external 
debt ≤ 0.5, and (iii) an international investor 
ranking ≤ 20 (out of 100); and 0 if not. 
Based on data listed above. 
Country boom  Dummy = 1 if a country’s dollar level of 
international reserves rises in a year by at least 
10%, from a level of at least the average for 
the entire 1980-2009 period; and 0 if not. 
Based on data listed above. 
DU_year(s)  Series of dummies for periods identified in 
Section III as years of global crises or booms 
 
Annual trend  Year of observation (1980-2009)  
UN voting with US Number of votes in the UN General Assembly 
designated as important by the US State 
Department in support of the US position, 
plus ½ the number of abstentions, divided by 
the total number of votes in the UN General 
Assembly designated as important by the US 
State Department. This follows the 
methodology of Thacker, 1999.  
Database of votes provided by 
Dreher for 1983-2008, as used 
in the papers by Dreher et al. 
2009a and 2009b; US State 
Department 2010 for 2009 
data.  
Government ideology A three-step left-right index of government 
political tendencies, with “1” coded as right, 
“3” as left, and “2” as moderate.  
Compiled by authors on the 
basis of the historical record. 
GDP per capita GDP per capita in 2007 US$ World Bank, 2010a; IMF, 
2010b for 2009 data.  
Inflation National consumer price index World Bank, 2010a; IMF, 
2010b for 2009 data. 
 
